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Non-technical summary
This paper asks whether the gap in subjective happiness between spouses matters per se
for a couple’s risk of separation. We use three panel databases to explore this question.
Controlling for the level of life satisfaction of spouses, we find that a higher satisfaction
gap, even in the first year of marriage, increases the probability of a separation. We
show that this basic relationship between the gap in satisfaction and the probability of
separation is robust to a number of different specifications. Moreover, the relationship
holds in all three countries that we study: Germany, the UK, and Australia.
Our interpretation is that this higher separation probability results from comparisons
of well-being between spouses and from an aversion to an unequal distribution of well-
being. While a growing number of studies has already underlined that comparisons
affect individual well-being, the advantage of the present article is to focus on a plausible
and important reference group, namely one’s own spouse. Another contribution of the
article is to show that subjective variables (here, the gap in life satisfaction) matter for
objectively measured outcomes such as a couple’s separation. Finally, we believe that
our result is interesting for the theoretical literature on the economics of the household,
which has so far neglected the consequences that an unequal distribution of well-being
may have.
We also explore the hypothesis that it is assortative mating with respect to the baseline
level of happiness that affects the risk of separation. We find that it is not only this
baseline level, but also the current level of happiness that matters. First, our results
hold in fixed-effects estimates that take away the effect of the initial quality of the match
between spouses: fixed-effects estimates suggest that a widening of the happiness gap
over time raises the risk of separation. Second, we uncover an asymmetry in the effect of
happiness gaps: couples are more likely to break up when the difference in life satisfaction
is unfavourable to the wife. The information available in the Australian survey reveals
that divorces are indeed predominantly initiated by women, and importantly, by women
who are unhappier than their husband. Hence, happiness gaps seem to matter to spouses,
not only because they reflect a mismatch in terms of baseline happiness, but because they
matter as such.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (German summary)
Der Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit Unterschiede in der Lebenszufriedenheit zwischen Part-
nern die Trennungswahrscheinlichkeit von Paaren beeinflussen. Dazu werden Paneldaten
aus drei Ländern analysiert. Zentrales Ergebnis der Studie ist, dass, selbst nach der
statistischen Berücksichtigung des Niveaus der Zufriedenheit und anderer relevanter Ein-
flussgrößen, die Trennungswahrscheinlichkeit umso höher ist, je stärker sich die Partner
in ihrer Lebenszufriedenheit unterscheiden. Dieser grundlegende Zusammenhang zwis-
chen den Unterschieden in der Lebenszufriedenheit und dem Trennungsrisiko erweist sich
als robust und lässt sich in allen drei untersuchten Ländern (Deutschland, Vereinigtes
Königreich und Australien) nachweisen.
Wir werten dieses Ergebnis als Beleg dafür, dass innerhalb des Paares Vergleiche der
Lebenszufriedenheit stattfinden, und dass es eine Abneigung gegen eine ungleiche Vertei-
lung der Zufriedenheit gibt. Der Einfluss von Einkommens- oder Statusvergleichen auf die
individuelle Zufriedenheit wurde bereits in einer Reihe jüngerer Studien herausgearbeitet;
der spezielle Beitrag der vorliegenden Studie liegt in ihrem Fokus auf einer plausiblen und
bedeutsamen Referenzgruppe, nämlich dem eigenen Lebenspartner oder der Lebenspart-
nerin. Ein weiterer Beitrag besteht darin, die Bedeutung subjektiver Variablen (hier:
von Unterschieden in der Lebenszufriedenheit) für objektiv messbare Ereignisse wie etwa
die Trennung eines Paares aufzuzeigen. Auch für die theoretische Literatur in der Fa-
milienökonomie sind die Ergebnisse von Interesse, denn bisher wurden die Folgen einer
Ungleichverteilung der Lebenszufriedenheit für den Haushalt in den theoretischen Mo-
dellen kaum berücksichtigt.
Die Untersuchung geht auch der Frage nach, ob die erhöhte Trennungswahrscheinlichkeit
allein Ausdruck eines schlechten Matches hinsichtlich des vor allem in der psychologischen
Literatur diskutieren Baseline-Niveaus der Lebenszufriedenheit ist. (Das Baseline-Niveau
ist das langfristig erreichte Niveau der Zufriedenheit.) Wir finden jedoch Anzeichen dafür,
dass auch der aktuelle und nicht nur der Baseline-Wert der Zufriedenheitsdifferenz eine
Rolle spielt. Dies wird in Schätzungen deutlich, die über die Zeit konstante Wirkun-
gen eines schlechten Matches kontrollieren. Es ist demnach nicht nur das Niveau der
Differenz der Lebenszufriedenheit, sondern auch die Veränderung in der Differenz, für
die sich ein Zusammenhang mit dem Trennungsrisiko nachweisen lässt. Ferner zeigen die
Schätzungen, dass die Unterschiede in der Lebenszufriedenheit asymmetrisch wirken: Das
Trennungsrisiko ist dann besonders hoch, wenn die Frau unzufriedener ist als der Mann.
Die Daten für Australien zeigen, dass in der Tat überwiegend Frauen die Scheidung ein-
reichen, und dass diese Frauen tendenziell unzufriedener sind als ihre Noch-Ehemänner.
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Abstract
This paper asks whether the gap in subjective happiness between spouses matters
per se, i.e. whether it predicts divorce. We use three panel databases to explore
this question. Controlling for the level of life satisfaction of spouses, we find that a
higher satisfaction gap, even in the first year of marriage, increases the likelihood
of a future separation. We interpret this as the effect of comparisons of well-being
between spouses, i.e. aversion to unequal sharing of well-being inside couples. To
our knowledge, this effect has never been taken into account by existing economic
models of the household. The relation between happiness gaps and divorce may be
due to the fact that couples which are unable to transfer utility are more at risk
than others. It may also be the case that assortative mating in terms of happiness
baseline-level reduces the risk of separation. However, we show that assortative
mating is not the end of the story. First, our results hold in fixed-effects estimates
that take away the effect of the initial quality of the match between spouses: fixed-
effects estimates suggest that a widening of the happiness gap over time raises the
risk of separation. Second, we uncover an asymmetry in the effect of happiness
gaps: couples are more likely to break-up when the difference in life satisfaction is
unfavourable to the wife. The information available in the Australian survey reveals
that divorces are indeed predominantly initiated by women, and importantly, by
women who are unhappier than their husband. Hence, happiness gaps seem to
matter to spouses, not only because they reflect a mismatch in terms of baseline
happiness, but because they matter as such.
Keywords: divorce, happiness, comparisons, panel, households, marriage
JEL codes: J12, D13, D63, D64, H31, I31, Z13
1 Introduction
Are people averse to welfare inequality? Are they making happiness comparisons? Is
this taking place even within couples? Based on three different panel datasets, this paper
suggests that this is indeed the case. Controlling for the level of well-being1 of spouses,
as well as their income, age, number of children and other characteristics that have been
found to associated with marriage stability, we find that a higher happiness gap between
spouses increases the risk of divorce. We take this as a piece of evidence that people care
for the distribution of well-being per se. This issue is the main motivation of the paper.
Income comparisons, status effects, as well as aversion to income inequality in general,
have been widely documented, especially in the realm of the labor market, but also in
society as a whole (see Clark et al. 2008; Senik 2009). Yet, the ultimate interest of
researchers, policy-makers and human beings in general lies in well-being, not in income
per se. The usual focus on income is because income, as opposed to well-being, is an
observable proxy and a metric of well-being, not only for researchers, but also in the
daily experience of individuals, workers and citizens. However, in small organizations, in
which people are involved into frequent, repeated and long term relationships, well-being
could to a certain degree be observable. Couples are obviously an extreme case of this
type of situations and it has actually been shown that spouses are able to predict each
other’s declared happiness (Sandvik et al. 1993). Actually, couples represent one of the
rare real life groups (as opposed to experimental settings) in which researchers can be
quite certain about the direction of comparisons that potentially occur between agents.
The second motivation of the paper is to contribute to the literature on marriage, divorce,
and interactions inside couples. To our knowledge, the hypothesis that there may exist
a preference for more equal sharing of utility among spouses has never been explored.
Although marriage and divorce may appear as ultimately private matters, they actually
bear important implications in terms of economic outcomes. For instance, as suggested
by Becker et al. (1977), the perspective of separation reduces the incentives of spouses
to invest in marriage specific assets such as the number and human capital of children.
Divorce is also related, both as a cause and a consequence, to the participation of women
in the labor market. Marriage and divorce and the regulations that relate to them thus
have a potential influence on these important aspects of economic life.
1Here we use the terms well-being, life satisfaction and happiness indifferently, and we assume that
these three self-declared mental states are approximations of experienced utility (as opposed to decision-
utility, which is unobservable, see Kahneman et al. 1997). De facto, these measures are highly correlated.
For instance, the correlation between self-declared life satisfaction and self-declared happiness, both
measured on a 1–10 ladder, is 0.7 in the European Social Survey (waves 2002, 2004, 2006).
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The third objective of the paper has to do with the reliability of subjective variables.
Showing that self-declared happiness actually has a predictive power on decisions and ac-
tions can strengthen the idea that it reflects more than the noise produced by mood, social
desirability biases, framework effects, question ordering and other unessential phenomena.
In the same spirit, Freeman (1978), Clark (2001), and Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen
(2006) have shown that job satisfaction is a strong predictor of job quits, even when con-
trolling for wages, hours of work and other standard individual and job variables.
We use three panel databases that contain a life satisfaction question labelled in a very
similar way. The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP, 1984-2007), the British House-
hold Panel Survey (BHPS, 1996-2007) and the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics
in Australia Survey (HILDA, 2001-2007). The two former have been widely used by the
scientific community, especially in the field of happiness economics.
We find that a happiness gap between spouses in any given year is positively associated
with the likelihood that a separation occurs in the following year. In order to mitigate
concerns about reverse causation, we show that even a happiness gap in the first year
of marriage (for couples who were surveyed during their first year of marriage) increases
the risk of a separation in any of the subsequent years in which individuals are observed.
We interpret this finding as resulting from an aversion to unequal sharing of well-being
inside couples. One explanation may be that couples that are unable to transfer utility
are more at risk than others. It may also be the case that assortative mating in terms of
happiness baseline-level reduces the risk of divorce. However, we show that assortative
mating is not the end of the story. First, our results hold in fixed-effects estimates that
take away the effect of the initial quality of the match between spouses: fixed-effects
estimates suggest that a widening of the happiness gap through time raises the risk of
separation. We also find that, after controlling for the lagged values of the happiness
gap, the coefficient on the current happiness gap is still statistically significant, which we
interpret as a sign that the effect goes beyond assortative mating.
Finally, we uncover an asymmetry in the effect of happiness gaps: the latter increase
the risk of separation when the wife is less happy than her husband, but the reverse is
not true. The information available in the Australian survey reveals that divorces are
indeed predominantly initiated by women. It also shows that women who report to be
the initiator for divorce were actually less happy than their husbands, whereas this is not
the case when the separation was initiated by the husband or by both spouses.
Hence, happiness gaps seem to matter to spouses, not only because they reflect a mis-
match in terms of baseline happiness, but because they matter as such.
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2 Happiness gaps and divorce in the economic liter-
ature
This paper belongs to the economic analysis of marriage and divorce. This literature
has focused on the reasons for marriage2, on the cause of marriage instability, on the
behavior of spouses in terms of demand for goods and supply of labor, on the efficiency of
the equilibrium in the case of cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining. However, to
our knowledge, the literature has barely addressed the issue of the difference in spouses’
utility or well-being as such.
In altruistic household models à la Becker (1974), the head of the household cares for the
welfare of each member, but not for the equality of welfare among members as such. In
collective models à la Chiappori (1988, 1992), spouses try to reach the highest collective
utility frontier, and then choose a point on the frontier to regulate the division. The
sharing rule depends on their respective preferences and bargaining power (“distribution
factors”), which depend inter alia on spouses’ outside wage, marriage and divorce legisla-
tion, child custody rules, or the sex ratio on the relevant (re-)marriage market. But the
sharing rule does not include a constraint on the degree of equality of outcomes. It is
true that: “In general, the higher the degree of caring, the narrower will be the range of
conflict. That is, both partners will agree to delete extremely unequal distributions from
the family’s choice set” (Weiss 1997, 93). But this does not mean that caring spouses
will necessarily equalize their well-being. In the case of non-cooperative models, where
members are represented as being linked by externalities, but acting non-cooperatively,
each person determines the variable under her control, taking the decision of her spouse
as given: the outcome can thus clearly be distributed very unequally across spouses, de-
pending on their relative threat points. Finally, couple dissolution occurs endogenously
when the value of marriage is less than the value of divorce. In cooperative models, util-
ity transfers take place until the aggregate utility of the marriage falls behind the total
utility of divorce. Again, utility gaps do not play any role in this decision. This very brief
discussion shows that the economic models of marriage do not contain any prediction
concerning the relation between utility gaps between spouses and the risk of divorce.
However, as underlined by Becker et al. (1977, 1144), in the case of cooperative bargain-
ing: “The conclusion that a couple dissolves their marriage if, and only if, their combined
2Marriage is considered as a “partnership for joint production and joint consumption”, such as “pro-
ducing and rearing children” (Weiss 1997). Other justifications for marriage include the existence of
couple-specific production technology or complementarities/substitutability between goods. Marriage as
a long term arrangement is also grounded on the benefits yielded by increasing returns to scale, the
division of labor, risk pooling and improved coordination between spouses Weiss (1997).
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wealth when dissolved exceeds their combined married-wealth, is a direct extension of the
conclusion that single persons marry if, and only if, their combined married-wealth ex-
ceeds their combined single-wealth. Both conclusions assume that the division of wealth
between spouses is flexible”. By contrast, in the case where utility is not transferable, uni-
lateral decision to divorce may happen even when they are not Pareto-improving. Hence,
the non-transferability of utility makes divorce more likely. As a corollary, marriages with
a very unequal distribution of welfare may be more unstable, because of the impossibility
to implement transfers of utility that could be Pareto-improving (if preferences are “car-
ing”). In the case of non-transferable utility, couples in which spouses are similar can be
expected to be more stable, as their similar features reduce the scope of conflicts. Hence,
when utility is not transferable, positive assortative mating is likely to be favorable to
the stability of marriage.
All in all, in the economic models of the household, once actions and sharing of utility
are realized (depending on the preferences and threat-points of each member), there is no
reason to expect that the remaining happiness gap should affect the likelihood of divorce.
In terms of empirical investigation, controlling for the variables that capture the gains to
marriage and the value of exiting the marriage for each spouse, and the total happiness
of the couple, there should thus be no statistical association between happiness gaps and
divorce. This paper tests this prediction. It finds that on the contrary, ceteris paribus,
happiness gaps are robustly associated with a higher likelihood of a future separation.
This result suggests that couples who are not willing or not able to realize equalizing
utility transfers are less viable than otherwise. Our interpretation is that this reflects a
concern for the distribution of welfare per se.
This paper naturally belongs to the subset of literature dedicated to marriage, divorce
and self-declared happiness, as measured in household surveys. A series of papers in
economics and psychology have shown evidence that, as compared to remaining single,
marriage has a positive impact on mental health (Gove et al. 1983), on physical health
(Wilson and Oswald 2005), on life satisfaction (Stutzer and Frey 2006; Zimmermann
and Easterlin 2006) and on life expectancy (Gardner and Oswald 2002; Hu and Goldman
1990). Stutzer and Frey (2006) have shown that the higher happiness of married people is
partly due to a selection effect (those to-be-married in the future are already happier than
those to-remain-single, even before they marry), but not entirely. Concerning divorce,
using the BHPS, Gardner and Oswald (2005) have shown that “divorcing couples become
happier by breaking up”. Hu and Goldman (1990), in a longitudinal survey, estimated that
divorced males have the highest ratios of mortality, relative to the married population, in
Asian countries, North America and Europe. However, this could stem from a selection
effect, as Stutzer and Frey (2006) found that the lower happiness of divorced people was
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already observable during their marriage.
A few papers of the same literature have tried to address the idea of altruism and intra-
household externalities of welfare. Powdthavee (2004) for instance has shown evidence
of positive spillovers of subjective well-being among spouses, using the British House-
hold Panel Survey. In a recent paper (Powdthavee 2009), he also shows that a negative
correlation of spouses’ subjective well-being is associated with a higher likelihood of di-
vorce. Schimmack and Lucas (2007), using the German Socio-Economic Panel, also find
some evidence of spousal similarity in life satisfactions. Bruhin and Winkelmann (2009)
provide evidence that parents’ self-declared happiness is positively correlated with their
children’s happiness; more “altruistic” parents actually make higher financial transfer
payments to their children.
Finally, this paper belongs to the literature dedicated to the effects of income distribution
and income comparisons on subjective well-being (see the surveys by Alesina and Giuliano
2007; Clark et al. 2008; Senik 2009). The difficulty in identifying the direction, intensity
and welfare effects of income comparisons has been addressed by an important literature
in the last decade. Empirical studies have predominantly documented the negative effect
of income comparisons, except in the case of signal effects whereby people compare to
others in order to acquire information about their own future prospects. As already
noticed, couples represent one of the rare real life groups (as opposed to experimental
settings) in which researchers can be quite certain about the direction of comparisons that
potentially occur between agents. With respect to this literature, the contribution of this
paper is to show evidence of happiness comparisons in the realm of within-household
interactions.
The next section presents the data. Section 4 presents the empirical specification. Section
5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.
3 Data
We use three large panel surveys, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the Household, Income and Labour Dy-
namics in Australia (HILDA), which include subjective happiness questions and contain
information about all adult members within households. Descriptive statistics of the
datasets are presented in the Appendix.
Admittedly, the focus of this paper is not on the comparison between Germany, the
United-Kingdom and Australia. Rather, our motivation is that the BHPS and the
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GSOEP are among the main panel datasets that have been used in the happiness lit-
erature, so that results obtained with both sources will have more generality. We com-
plement these by a more recent data set (HILDA) that contains very useful subjective
variables. Conducting the same analysis separately on three data sets is a way to include
a self-contained “replication check” on the validity of the results. Using several datasets
also allows relating complementary pieces of information. For instance, the GSOEP has
information on expected life satisfaction, whereas HILDA has, among other things, in-
formation about who initiated the divorce.
3.1 The GSOEP
The GSOEP3 is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of private households,
which has been conducted annually since 1984. It includes information on objective living
conditions and many subjective attitudes. Self-declared happiness (“How satisfied are you
with your life, all things considered?”) is a categorical variable that takes on values 0-10
(where 0 is “totally unhappy” and 10 is “totally happy”) and is available for every year
in the survey. GSOEP includes a separate spell dataset for marital status, indicating the
beginning and ending date of each marriage spell.
Our regression sample covers the years 1984–2007, and includes 224 758 legally married
person-years and 28 576 cohabitating person-years. From 1984 to 2007, we have 4074
separations. 2460 separations are from legally married people and 1614 are from de facto
relationships. In average, couples are observed for an average duration of 21.2 years (21.9
for legally married people and 5.3 for de facto relationships). We also observe 3253 new
marriages. We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18-65, and we exclude transitions
into widowhood. Our regression sample thus includes 253 334 observations with a valid
partner number, i.e. 58 374 individuals. The probability of separation from one’s partner,
conditional on having a partner in the previous period, is 2.02.
3.2 The BHPS
The BHPS4 is a longitudinal annual household survey that began in 1991 . The wording
of the life satisfaction question that we are using is “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you
with your life overall?” The answers are measured on a scale from 1 (not satisfied at
all) to 7 (completely satisfied). This question about life satisfaction has been asked in
3For further information on the GSOEP: http://panel.gsoep.de/soepinfo2008/
4Detailed information about the BHPS can be found at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/survey/
bhps
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all waves since 1996, with the exception of 2001. Our regression sample contains only
people who live with a partner for at least one year during the period of observation.
We also restrict the sample to individuals aged 18–65, and we exclude transitions into
widowhood. These restrictions leave us with 90 727 person-year observations with a
valid partner identifier. These observations come from 15 226 individuals. For 1 743
observations (that is, about 2.3% of the sample), we observe a break-up. In most of the
estimations, we further restrict our sample to married couples. In this case, the number
of person-year observations is 72 619, for 11 814 individuals. As is to be expected, the
share of separations is lower for married couples, at about 1.3%.
In the BHPS, the (uncensored) length of marriage is only available for a subset of the
individuals, and only for first marriages. This average length is about 21.1 years. The
average number of years in which an individual (married or not) is observed with the
same partner in our sample (conditional on being together in period t) is about 4.1 years.
This is of course a left-censored measure of the duration of the couple.
3.3 HILDA
HILDA is an Australian nationally representative household-based panel study, run an-
nually since 2001 in order to collect information on economic and subjective well-being,
labor market dynamics and family dynamics in Australia.5 Interviews are conducted
annually with all adult members of each selected household. Respondents declare their
level of life satisfaction: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life? Pick
a number between 0 and 10 to indicate how satisfied you are (0: Totally dissatisfied,
5: Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 10: Totally satisfied)”. The data has very detailed
information on relationships and life events that occur in each year. This paper uses the
first seven waves of the HILDA survey (2001 to 2007). We consider all individuals who
have been married or living with a partner at least once during the survey and whose
partner is also identified. Our regression sample contains 25 716 individuals for a total
of 90 548 person-year observations. From 2001 to 2007, we observe 2865 separations and
1813 marriages. In the survey, couples are observed for an average duration of 19.5 years
(22.7 for legally married people and 4.8 for de facto relationships).
For each survey, we construct two datasets: the sample of women and the sample of men,
which contain all women (resp. men) who have been married or living with a partner
at some point during the survey. Each woman (resp. man) is matched with her spouse




In the three databases, women appear to be slightly happier than men.6 The absolute
value of the happiness gap between spouses is represented in figures 1, 2 and 3 in the
Appendix. In general, in about one third of couples, both spouses declare exactly the
same happiness level. A difference of one step is observed in over another third of cou-
ples. Hence, the situation in which spouses equalize their levels of happiness is indeed
predominant.
4 Empirical specification
Following the existing empirical literature (see Becker et al. 1977; Bumpass and Sweet
1972; Smock et al. 1999; Weiss and Willis 1997), we model the probability of a separation
depending on the value of being in marriage versus out-of-marriage (household income,
education of spouses, children, duration of marriage) and of the potential threat points of
each spouse (individual income, education, age and age difference between spouses, etc.).
We are interested in testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the happiness gap
is not significant. Our basic specification is the following:
Separationt+1 = f(total happinesst, abs. value of happiness difference between spousest,
aget, age differencet, log(household incomet), number of childrent) (1)
where Separationt+1 is the probability that a couple observed in year t is dissolved in
year t + 1, and total happinesst is the sum of the self-declared happiness of the spouses
in year t.
Because of collinearity, it is not possible to include husband’s happiness, wife’s hap-
piness and the happiness difference between spouses among the explanatory variables.
We therefore need to recourse to a nonlinear specification of the happiness gap between
spouses. Our main specification consists in including the absolute value of the happiness
gap between a respondent and her spouse, together with the total happiness gap. As
an alternative specification, we also consider dummy variables that take value one if the
self-declared happiness of the wife is greater (respectively lesser and equal) than that of
6In GSOEP, for the 112811 observations on married women, the difference is 0.035 (significant at 1%)
and for the 14691 observations on cohabiting women, the difference is 0.039 (significant at 5%). In the
BHPS, for the 32735 observations on married women, the difference is 0.045 (significant at 1%) and for
the 6678 observations on cohabiting women, the difference is 0.018 (not significant). Finally, in HILDA,
for the 23432 observations on married women, the difference is 0.118 (significant at 1%) and for the 5368
observations on cohabiting women, the difference is 0.074 (significant at 1%).
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the husband. In robustness analysis, we also use the ratio of the happiness level of the
happier spouse to the unhappier one, and of the wife to the husband. We estimate these
relations on the pooled data, using alternatively a probit specification and a fixed-effect
logit specification. In the probit models, we cluster standard errors by individual, in order
to correct for the autocorrelation of observations that pertain to the same individual.
Because we model the probability to divorce, a possibility could be to use a duration
model. However, Sueyoshi (1995) has shown that a much simpler logit or probit model
with period specific variables yields similar results. Kraft and Neimann (2009) use a
complementary log-log model with a marriage duration specific dummy variables, which
is perfectly equivalent to a discrete-time proportional hazard model, but is better suited
for the analysis of rare events like divorce. We check that our results are maintained with
this specification.
In addition to this basic specific specification, in the robustness analysis, we control for
other determinants of divorce which have been uncovered by the empirical literature, such
as, for both spouses: religion, objective and subjective health, BMI, height, duration of
marriage, country of origin, labor market status, work experience, years of schooling,
number of working hours, months of previous unemployment, house ownership, number
of previous legal marriages and cohabitations, management of household budget, share
of household work, the fact of having had divorced parents, etc. (see for instance Weiss
and Willis 1997). We also control for year fixed effects in the probit estimates.
Of course, this exercise is based on the assumption that spouses compare their level of
happiness, i.e. that they are able to observe the level of happiness of their spouse. It
has indeed been shown (Sandvik et al. 1993) that the level of happiness declared by
an individual is correlated with the level of happiness that her spouse perceives her to
experience. To be safe, we run fixed-effect estimates that eliminate any anchoring effect
or misperception of happiness that could characterize a couple in an invariant way.
We present the results based on the sample of women. The same results are obtained on
the sample of men. Due to space constraints, we do not reproduce the latter in the text,
but we keep them available to any interested reader.
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5 Results
5.1 Happiness gaps increase the likelihood of separations
Tables 1, 2 and 3 present estimation results for our basic specification. Controlling for
the total level of happiness of a couple (as well as age, age difference between spouses,
number of children and log real household income), an increase in the happiness gap of
one unit raises the probability of separation by 0.24% in Germany (GSOEP), 0.3% in
Australia (HILDA) and 0.1% in the United-Kingdom (BHPS). Given that the average
risk of separation in the samples is about 1.8%, this represents a non negligible share of
the average risk of break-ups.
Table 1: GSOEP. Probit estimate of the probability to break-up next year. Female sample.
Marg. eff. t
Absolute value of happiness difference 0.002369 8.3
Total happiness -0.002223 17.0
Age -0.002223 6.1
Own age minus spouse age -0.000103 1.0
Number of children -0.003781 7.5
Log real monthly household income -0.004058 4.6
Pseudo R-squared 0.0332
Number of observations 100644
Note: Whole sample (married and cohabiting). Standard errors clustered
at individual level
Table 2: HILDA. Probit estimate of the probability to break-up next year. Female sample.
Marg. eff. t
Absolute value of happiness difference 0.003020 4.1
Total happiness -0.003183 7.7
Age -0.000990 12.0
Own age minus spouse age 0.000922 3.7
Number of children 0.001416 1.9
Log real monthly household income -0.026942 0.9
Pseudo R squared 0.0845
Number of observations 19394
Note: Whole sample (married and cohabiting). Standard errors clustered
at individual level
Running the estimates separately on the sub-sample of legally married people versus
cohabitating couples, we find that the effect of the happiness gap is typically several
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Table 3: BHPS. Probit estimate of the probability to break-up next year. Female sample.
Marg. eff. t
Absolute value of happiness difference .001019 1.9
Total happiness -.003926 -12.5
Age -.001179 -20.8
Own age minus spouse age .000341 2.5
Number of children (aged < 16) -.0005622 -1.0
Log real monthly household income -.003585 -4.0
Pseudo R squared 0.11
Number of observations 30897
Note: Whole sample (married and cohabiting). Standard errors clustered
at individual level
times higher for cohabitating couples than it is for legally married couples. For instance,
in Germany, an increase of 1 in the happiness gap raises the probability of separation
by 0.16% for legally married couples, versus 0.5% for cohabitating couples. In Australia,
an increase of 1 percent in the happiness gap raises the probability of a break-up by
0.2% for legally married couples, versus 0.9% for cohabitating Accordingly, when we
introduced a dummy variable standing for legally married (versus de facto) couples, the
coefficient associated to this dummy was always statistically significantly negative (with
1% confidence level) and varied from -2% (GSOEP and BHPS) to -5% (HILDA). In the
sequel, in order to be conservative, we display the results obtained with the sub-sample
of legally married couples, and we mention the size of the effect for the rest of the sample
in the text.
In order to understand which couples are most concerned by this effect, we interacted
the absolute value of the happiness difference with a large number of variables. (In these
models, we also included the interacted variables as regressors to capture not only the
interaction effects, but also the main effects). It turned out that few variables significantly
modify the effect of the happiness gaps. The statistical association between happiness
gaps and the risk of divorce was particularly strong for higher levels of female income and
for couples where the housework load is supported predominantly by women (GSOEP).
It was weaker for women who declared that they attach a high importance to family
(GSOEP, HILDA), to a good partnership (BHPS) or to religion (HILDA), and for couples
with a longer marriage duration (HILDA, BHPS).
The effects of the other controls included in our main specification are consistent with
the existing literature: the probability of divorce decreases with the log of total real
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household income and with the age of spouses, but increases with the age difference (wife
- husband). The association between the number of children and marriage stability was
most often negative but not stable.
For robustness, we added a series of additional controls to our main specification. The
main result (i.e. the association between the happiness gap and the probability of divorce)
proved robust to the inclusion of these controls. Because of space constraints, we cannot
report all the results in the entire tables; we simply cite the controls that appeared
to be statistically significantly correlated with the probability of divorce. The most
remarkable (but classical) result is that the risk of divorce increases with the wife’s
individual income but falls with the husband’s individual income. Other factors that
increase the risk of divorce include self-employment of the husband, and having divorced
parents. Controls that are negatively associated with the risk of divorce are situations in
which the wife is retired, housewife or full-time student (controlling for age), the age at
marriage (which is usually taken to capture the length of the search, hence the quality
of the marriage), spouses being born in the same country, sharing the same religion
(especially if catholic) owning one’s house (GSOEP, HILDA), declaring “a fair sharing of
housework” (see also Stauder 2005; Kraft and Neimann 2009), couples in which finance
are shared or maintained separately rather than managed by one spouse only (BHPS),
and, of course, own and spouse’s individual happiness and subjective mental health. The
effect of education on marriage stability is not stable, conformingly to the literature,
which posits an a priori ambiguous effect.7
We also ran various other robustness tests. In terms of specification, we checked that
the results show in Tables 1, 2 and 3 were left essentially unchanged in a complementary
log-log specification, as well as in a rare events logit specification. We also checked that
the results were essentially unchanged when the German sample (GSOEP) was restricted
to West Germans. As a measure of the happiness gap, we replaced the absolute value
of the happiness difference with the ratio of wife/husband’s happiness, or of the happier
to the unhappier spouse. We also replicated all our results using the post-estimation
residual happiness (including the usual controls as defined in equation (1)) instead of the
happiness level (see Powdthavee 2009). The results were essentially unaltered. Because
of space constraints, we do not display all these robustness tests.
7Higher education makes an individual financially less dependent on her spouse, but on the other
hand, it increases the non monetary gain from marriage due to the valuable characteristics of this person
and it also reduces the chance that her expectations concerning marriage were false (Kraft and Neimann
2009).
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5.2 Ruling out reverse causality and other alternative explana-
tions
We interpret the effect of happiness gaps on divorce as expressing a concern for relative
happiness. However, we need to rule out alternative interpretations, such as the reverse
causality running from the expectation of divorce in the near future to the happiness gap.
Infidelity of one spouse is likely to create such a situation, especially if the infidel spouse
is planning to dissolve her marriage in order to form another couple with her new partner
(South and Lloyd 1995). More generally, reverse causality could stem from a situation
in which the marriage is failing and the perspective of divorce makes one of the spouses
more unhappy than the other.
It could also be the case that an unexpected event affects both spouses differently and
destabilizes the couple by creating a wedge between the expected value of marriage and
its realization (Becker et al. 1977). Examples of this include shocks to the expected
earning capacity of a spouse (Weiss and Willis 1997), job losses or health shocks (Charles
and Stephens Jr. 2004).
We try to rule out these mechanisms using different methods. First, we control for one
to five years lagged values of the happiness gap. This is useful if the impact of a shock is
likely to be felt in the couple of years after it occurs. As shown by table 13, we do observe
a significant impact of lagged happiness gaps on the probability to divorce in (t+ 1).
However, the effect of shocks, or infidelity, may be more persistent. In order to go as far
as possible in trying to overcome this problem, we consider the sub-sample of couples who
are already under observation in the survey in the first year of their marriage. We then
look at the effect of the absolute value of the happiness gap in the first year of marriage
on the probability to ever divorce in subsequent years, during the period of observation.
Tables 14, 15 and 16 show that an initial happiness gap of 1 increases the probability
that a separation is observed during the observation period by 2.3 percentage points in
Germany and Australia, and by 4.3 percentage points in the United Kingdom.
We thus observe a statistically significant effect of happiness gaps in the first year of
marriage, hence (hopefully) before the occurrence of most shocks. We also checked that
our main result holds when controlling for shocks to the income and health status of each
spouse. Introducing such controls did not change the order of magnitude of the coefficient
on the happiness gap. In the BHPS, disability, unemployment or self-declared health
status of either spouse did not have a statistically significant impact on the probability
to divorce. In the GSOEP, we used company closures and unexpected disability shocks,
which are likely to be exogenous events. We found that these were not statistically
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associated with the probability to divorce in later years. Concerning the Australian
survey, we used a series of reported life events, such as serious personal injury/illness,
serious injury/illness to a family member, death of child, death of close relative, death
of a close friend, being victim of physical violence, victim of property crime, detained in
jail, fired, retired, major improvement in finances, major worsening in finances. All these
additional controls did not change the magnitude of the coefficient on the happiness gap.
Finally, concerning the difference between expectations and realizations, we used a series
of questions of the GSOEP, labelled in the following way: “1. In conclusion, we would like
to ask you about your satisfaction with your life in general. Please answer according to the
following scale: 0 means ’completely dissatisfied’, 10 means ’completely satisfied’. 2. And
how do you think you will feel in five years? 3. How happy were you a year ago with your
life? 4. And what do you think it will be like in a year’s time?” We include the difference
between current happiness (question 1) and 5-years-lagged expected future happiness
(question 2); we also include the difference between current happiness (question 1) and
one-year-lagged expected happiness (question 4). Including these additional controls in
the main specification left our main result unchanged.
5.3 Assortative mating
The finding that happiness gaps, even those that are already observable in the first year
of marriage, are associated with a higher risk of divorce could be interpreted as a sign
of assortative mating in terms of happiness baseline-level. The economic theory of mar-
riage predicts a “predominance of positive assortative mating with respect to personal
characteristics such as education, height, intelligence, age, property income, physical at-
tractiveness, etc. [. . . ] all traits which are not good substitutes in the production of
commodity income, while negative assortative mating would be optimal for substitutes,
such as wage earning power” (Becker et al. 1977, 1146). This prediction has been con-
firmed by several empirical studies (e.g. Lehrer and Chiswick 1993; Contoyannis and
Jones 2004; Kalmĳn 1994; Kalmĳn et al. 2005). As an illustration, Weiss and Willis
(1997) find evidence that couples with similar level of schooling are more likely to marry
and less likely to divorce. Likewise, similarity in terms of age, region of origin, ethnicity,
religion, and social background have been found to be associated with longer durations
of marriages (see Frimmel et al. 2009, for a survey), an observation that is confirmed in
our surveys (see section 5.1).
Matching could also happen along the dimension of well-being. Some psychologists
(Lykken and Tellegen 1996; Headey and Wearing 1992) have suggested that individu-
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als are characterized by a setpoint (or baseline-level) of happiness, considered as a type
of personality trait, partly determined by genetics. In this view, individuals can deviate
from their baseline-level following shocks, but will eventually return to this level after a
process of adaptation. Fujita and Diener (2005) and Schimmack and Lucas (2007) have
questioned the relevance of this theory using the GSOEP. They found that individual
self-declared happiness fluctuates significantly across time and is less stable than other
objective health measures such as weight, body mass index, systolic and diastolic blood
pressure and personality traits. Nonetheless, we do find some sign of assortative mating
in the three datasets that we use.
First, the happiness levels of spouses are positively correlated. This point is illustrated by
figures 1, 2 and 3, and has been established in the literature, in particular by Powdthavee
(2004) and Schimmack and Lucas (2007). Second, we followed some authors who have
noticed that individuals remain in a certain zone of the happiness scale most of their lives
(Davern et al. 2007; Cummins et al. 2008). For instance, people whose declared happiness
level is under 5 on a 0-10 ladder rarely bypass that threshold; conversely, people whose
declared level is above 7 rarely fall behind this threshold. Accordingly, we divided the
samples of couples who are observed in their first year of marriage into three groups,
depending on their level of happiness in their first year of marriage. We then tabulated
the cross-distribution of spouses’ happiness in terms of these groups. In Tables 7, 8 and
9 in the Appendix, the frequencies are particularly high in the diagonal. A majority of
women appear to be matched with men of the same happiness category. For instance, in
the United-Kingdom, 61% of the highest happiness tier women appeared to be married
with men of the same category. 48% of women of the intermediate happiness group were
married with men of the same category. These figures are even higher in Germany and
Australia.
A possible interpretation of the joint findings of (i) assortative mating with regards to
well-being and (ii) the effect of happiness gaps on divorce, could be that utility (or
well-being) is not easily transferable among spouses. The economics of the household
usually assumes that utility transfers are possible, and take the form of income transfers,
compromise, or spillovers of happiness, i.e. contagion. However, if well-being is not
transferable, and if happiness gaps matter per se, it is important to choose a partner
whose level of well-being is “naturally” on the same level as one’s own, either because it
is a natural personality trait as such, or because both spouses have identical preferences,
which lead them to chose similar actions and reach similar levels of “primary” happiness
(before any redistribution). In this framework, our results can be interpreted as a sign of
positive assortative matching and limited transferability of utility.
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However, assortative mating does not totally explain the effect of happiness gaps on
divorce. First, we find that, after controlling for the lagged values of the happiness gap,
or for the initial happiness gap in the first year of marriage, the coefficient on current
happiness gap is still statistically significant in all surveys.8 Second, we show that the risk
of future divorce is associated not only with the level of the happiness gap but also with
its evolution in time. The effect of happiness gaps on divorce holds in fixed-effect logit
estimates, which eliminate the effect of the time-invariant quality of the match between
spouses. Tables 17 and 18 show that when the happiness gap becomes unfavourable to
the wife, this increases the risk of divorce (the results are not statistically significant for
the Australian dataset). Hence, the effect of happiness gaps on the risk of divorce cannot
be entirely attributed to the initial quality of the marriage.
Finally, in the three datasets, we checked that the happiness gap between former spouses
decreases with time after divorce (χ2 tests reject the null that the happiness gap is equal
before divorce and 2 years, 3 years and 4 years after divorce, at 1%). However, admittedly,
the happiness gap between former spouses always remains statistically significantly higher
than that of couples who remain married (by a magnitude of 15% to 30% depending on
the dataset; χ2 tests reject the null that the happiness gap is equal for divorced and
married couples at 1%).
5.4 Asymmetry
An important observation, which suggests that assortative matching does not entirely
explain our findings, is that the effect of happiness gaps is asymmetric. Happiness gaps are
associated with a higher probability of a future divorce only when they are unfavourable
to women, but not to men. Tables 19, 20 and 21 show that the situation in which the wife
is unhappier than her husband is associated with a higher risk of divorce in the following
year: by 0.5% in Germany, 0.4% in Australia, and 0.3% in Great-Britain. Concerning
cohabitating couples, the risk is ten times higher. This asymmetry holds in the fixed
effects estimates, as already shown by Tables 17 and 18. The effect is again ten times
higher for cohabitating couples.
This naturally leads to the question whether divorce is actually initiated by women when
they are unhappier than their husband. In the 2005, 2006 and 2007 waves, the Australian
survey contains retrospective information on the person who initiated the separation.
The findings are impressive: in the sample of female respondents, 60% of women report
that they were responsible for the decision to separate. Only 16% of women attribute the
8Note that the correlation between current happiness gaps and lagged values is constantly inferior to
0.3.
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responsibility to their husband and 24% declare that the separation was initiated by both
spouses. Surprisingly, in the sample of husband respondents, 36% report that the divorce
was initiated by their wife, 27% by themselves and 37% that it was a joint decision.
Hence, it does seem that divorces are predominantly initiated by women, although the
exact proportion is subject to doubt. In the case of Germany, a study of the Ministry of
the family, realized in 2003, also shows that about two thirds of divorces are initiated by
women (quoted by Kraft and Neimann 2009).
Importantly, the Australian data also reveals that women who report to have initiated
divorce were actually less happy than husbands.9 By contrast, χ2 tests do not allow
rejecting the null hypothesis of equality of satisfaction between spouses when the decision
to divorce has been taken by both spouses or by the husband. This is consistent with the
idea that some divorces are initiated by women, not only because they are unhappy, but
because they are less happy than their husband.
Are women more subject to happiness comparisons; do they attach more importance to
the couple as a spillover mechanism; or do they expect more from their marriage than
men, as opposed to other domains of life? We are unable to answer these questions
at this stage. In years 2000 to 2007, a special module of the GSOEP, dedicated to
youth biography, surveyed members of the households aged 16 to 19 years old, i.e. 2805
individuals (each individual surveyed only once). Some of the questions shed some light
on our results. The survey shows that a slightly higher proportion of women expect to
get married (70% versus 68% for men) rather than to live with a partner (50% versus
53%); however, women less often consider that “a partner is necessary to be happy in
life” (64% versus 71%). A proportion of 32% of women (but only 25% of men) consider
that “one can be just as happy without a partner”. Women also more often than men
declare that “it is all right for a couple with an unhappy marriage to get a divorce, even
if there are children”, or that “marriage is an outdated institution”, and less often agree
that “marriage is a lifetime relationship and should never be ended” (all these differences
are statistically significant). This suggests that the new generation of German women do
not exclude exit (rather than voice or loyalty) as a possible solution in case of marital
conflict.
9Their average level of happiness was 6.89 (0.30) versus 7.7 (0.21) for their husband, and the difference
is significant at the 5% level (χ2 test statistic of 0.0104).
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6 Conclusions
This paper offers new empirical evidence concerning the existence of happiness com-
parisons between spouses. Conditional on the individual levels of happiness, or on the
aggregate level of happiness of the couple, a higher happiness difference between spouses
reduces the stability of their marriage.
This result is robust to the inclusion of a series of controls that are classically taken to
determine the stability of marriage. We address the risk of reverse causation by showing
that the risk of divorce is statistically associated with the happiness gap in the first year
of marriage (for those who are surveyed in the first year of their marriage). This finding
points to the potential importance of assortative mating. However, the effect of happiness
gaps goes beyond assortative mating, as shown by fixed effects estimates that neutralize
the invariant quality of the match. Moreover, we uncover an asymmetry in the effect
of the happiness gap: the latter is a cause of divorce only in the case when the wife is
unhappier than her spouse. Our interpretation of these findings is that there exists a pure
preference for equal distributions of well-being in couples, in other words, a comparison
of well-being effect between spouses (which is particularly strong for women).
It is possible that couples that are not able to transfer and equalize their happiness
levels are more at risk of divorce. In many versions of the popular cooperative models of
household bargaining, partners are represented as taking sequentially decisions in order
to maximize their joint output (or aggregate welfare) and then distribute it among them.
This interpretation rests on the assumption that utility is transferable, i.e. that the initial
distribution of well-being across spouses is easily modifiable, exactly as primary income
can be modified by income redistribution by the state. However, it may prove difficult
to transfer utility between spouses, i.e. to modify the primary distribution of happiness
that results from their actions. This could explain why assortative mating in terms of
happiness is associated with a higher stability of marriage (because spouses do not need
to redistribute utility in this case). This also suggests that when spouses “agree” on
too unequal a distribution of welfare, this puts the durability of their marriage at risk.
From this point of view, public policy should avoid giving spouses incentives that lead
to diverging levels of happiness. Individual income and employment have been shown to
be among the main determinants of happiness; policies that affect the division of labour
inside households should keep this in mind.
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Figure 1: GSOEP. Absolute value of the happiness gap between spouses. 1984-2007
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BHPS: absolute value of happiness difference
Figure 3: BHPS. Absolute value of the happiness gap between spouses. 1996–2007
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Summary statistics
Table 4: GSOEP. Summary statistics
Men Women
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Happiness 7.03 1.79 125622 7.07 1.80 127334
Happiness difference -0.04 1.67 121720 0.04 1.67 121720
Age 48.65 14.51 125621 45.74 14.32 127333
Log household income 7.75 0.50 118308 7.74 0.50 119936
Household size 3.10 1.22 125622 3.10 1.22 127334
Number of children 0.75 1.02 125622 0.75 1.02 127334
Working full-time 0.68 0.02 85302 0.28 0.01 35237
Working part-time 0.02 0.01 1726 0.19 0.02 24229
Vocational training 0.001 0.01 462 0.01 0.01 791
Irregular part-time 0.01 0.01 1392 0.05 0.01 6133
Not working 0.29 1.67 36739 0.48 0.01 60939
Education years 11.87 2.71 123778 2.33 2.50 125146
< high school completed 0.17 0.01 20680 0.28 0.01 35300
High school completed 0.62 0.01 77595 0.57 0.01 71338
> high school completed 0.21 0.01 25938 0.15 0.01 18975
Annual working hours 1649.08 1117.80 125621 892.74 964.03 127333
Housework hours per week 2.52 2.67 114117 8.91 4.63 124377
Housework hours per week difference -6.31 5.31 110945 6.31 5.31 110945
Age at marriage 30.61 6.43 1006 27.90 5.91 1069
Height in cm 177.45 7.16 22484 165.27 6.31 22964
BMI 26.79 3.79 22466 25.21 4.67 22868
Annual doctor visits 9.68 17.61 116093 11.48 17.59 117745
Very good health 0.01 0.01 7286 0.01 0.00 7301
Good health 0.41 0.02 37605 0.41 0.00 37860
Satisfactory health 0.35 0.02 31524 0.34 0.01 31613
Poor health 0.13 0.01 11560 0.14 0.01 12967
Bad health 0.04 0.00 3170 0.04 0.01 3008
Germany born 0.81 0.01 101419 0.83 0.01 103866
Both spouses Germany born 0.77 0.01 96023 0.76 0.01 96766
Importance of family 3.83 0.39 17102 3.87 0.35 17317
Note: This table shows the summary statistics of variables for respondents who were surveyed
in the GSOEP from 1984 to 2007 and who have a partner at time t. Means are reported for
the continuous variables and proportions are reported for categorical variables.
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Table 5: HILDA. Summary statistics
Men Women
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Happiness 7.92 1.48 29199 8.01 1.51 33341
Happiness difference -0.12 1.61 18895 0.12 1.61 19461
Age 43.33 17.78 30214 43.53 17.94 34269
Log household income 5.83 0.70 30070 5.75 0.73 34099
Household size 2.94 1.47 30214 2.92 1.47 34269
Number of children 1.68 1.54 18301 1.85 1.54 21053
Employed 0.71 0.02 20733 0.58 0.01 19159
Unemployed 0.04 0.01 1044 0.03 0.02 1010
Not in the labor force 0.26 1.67 7433 0.40 0.01 13186
< high school completed 0.30 0.01 8945 0.41 0.01 13917
High school completed 0.13 0.01 3793 0.15 0.01 5067
> high school completed 0.58 0.01 17463 0.45 0.01 15279
Weekly working hours 42.41 15.18 20713 30.76 15.24 19135
Housework hours per week 6.01 6.91 22583 16.57 14.13 26059
Housework hours per week difference -13.78 15.89 14433 13.88 15.85 14750
Age at marriage 39.10 14.81 622 36.01 13.65 657
Very good health 0.13 0.01 3399 0.11 0.00 3634
Good health 0.36 0.02 9756 0.37 0.00 11488
Satisfactory health 0.36 0.02 9561 0.35 0.01 11003
Poor health 0.14 0.01 3694 0.14 0.01 4305
Bad health 0.03 0.00 842 0.03 0.01 899
Australian born 0.78 0.01 22715 0.66 0.01 6494
Both spouses Australian born 0.66 0.01 12428 0.76 0.01 12833
Importance of family 9.38 1.31 4963 9.66 0.97 5642
Note: This table shows the summary statistics of variables for respondents who were surveyed in the
HILDA from 2001 to 2007 and who have a partner at time t. Means are reported for the continuous
variables and proportions are reported for categorical variables.
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Table 6: BHPS. Summary statistics
Men Women
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Life satisfaction 5.23 1.16 36866 5.30 1.23 42399
Satisfaction difference (own - spouse) -0.05 1.44 34981 0.04 1.45 36454
Age 43.55 11.57 42200 42.44 11.90 48527
Log real monthly personal income 7.35 1.07 41423 6.60 1.11 47178
Household size 3.25 1.23 42200 3.24 1.23 48527
Number of children (aged < 16) 0.81 1.04 42199 0.80 1.04 48526
Male 1.00 0.00 42200 0.00 0.00 48527
Paid employment 0.69 0.46 42181 0.62 0.49 48505
Self-employed 0.15 0.35 42181 0.05 0.21 48505
Unemployed 0.04 0.19 42181 0.02 0.14 48505
Retired 0.06 0.23 42181 0.07 0.26 48505
Maternity leave 0.05 0.22 42181 0.04 0.20 48505
Family care 0.00 0.01 42181 0.01 0.11 48505
Full-time student 0.01 0.08 42181 0.17 0.38 48505
Disabled, long-term sickness 0.01 0.07 42181 0.01 0.10 48505
Government training scheme 0.00 0.02 42181 0.00 0.02 48505
Other type of employment 0.00 0.06 42181 0.00 0.07 48505
Years of schooling 10.15 1.13 41025 10.18 1.16 46664
Less than first degree 0.84 0.37 41644 0.86 0.35 47921
Completed first degree 0.12 0.33 41644 0.12 0.32 47921
Completed higher degree 0.04 0.19 41644 0.03 0.16 47921
Maternity leave 0.05 0.22 42181 0.04 0.20 48505
Government training scheme 0.00 0.02 42181 0.00 0.02 48505
Other type of employment 0.00 0.06 42181 0.00 0.07 48505
Hours normally worked per week 26.73 19.54 42094 18.12 16.33 48415
Hours per week on housework 5.54 5.70 41817 17.10 11.11 47954
Diff. in hours of housework (own minus spouse) -11.41 12.99 39621 11.45 13.01 41337
Age at marriage 25.40 5.10 15211 23.37 4.67 17622
Height in centimeters 177.91 7.29 6432 162.56 6.54 8123
Body mass index 27.10 4.48 6128 26.66 5.27 6307
No doctor visits 0.34 0.48 42160 0.19 0.39 48478
One or two doctor visits 0.39 0.49 42160 0.36 0.48 48478
Three to five doctor visits 0.15 0.36 42160 0.22 0.42 48478
Six to ten doctor visits 0.06 0.24 42160 0.11 0.32 48478
More than ten doctor visits 0.05 0.22 42160 0.10 0.31 48478
Health: very poor 0.02 0.12 38324 0.02 0.14 44107
Health: poor 0.06 0.23 38324 0.07 0.26 44107
Health: fair 0.18 0.38 38324 0.20 0.40 44107
Health: good 0.47 0.50 38324 0.47 0.50 44107
Health: excellent 0.27 0.45 38324 0.24 0.43 44107
Born in UK 0.95 0.21 41895 0.95 0.23 48256
Both spouses born in UK 0.92 0.27 39425 0.92 0.27 39286
Resp. looks after household money 0.14 0.34 3434 0.25 0.43 3963
Partner looks after household money 0.26 0.44 3434 0.13 0.33 3963
Respondent given household allowance 0.01 0.08 3434 0.05 0.21 3963
Partner given household allowance 0.04 0.19 3434 0.01 0.09 3963
Finances shared 0.49 0.50 3434 0.49 0.50 3963
Finances maintained separately 0.06 0.24 3434 0.07 0.25 3963
Importance of good partnership 9.61 0.85 5959 9.65 0.89 6762
Importance of children 7.81 2.66 5952 8.32 2.54 6757
Religion makes a difference 0.27 0.44 10967 0.37 0.48 12655
Note: BHPS 1996–2007. The sample includes only people who live with a partner in t.
Assortative mating by happiness level in the first year of mar-
riage
Table 7: GSOEP. Assortative mating by happiness level in the first year of marriage.
Husband’s happiness
Wife’s happiness 1 2 3
1 29.27 48.78 21.95
2 4.07 61.05 34.88
3 1.75 28.55 69.7
Note: 1 if self-declared happiness < 5; 2 if happiness
= 5, 6, 7; 3 if happiness > 7. 69.7% of women in the
highest happiness group are married with men in the
same group (in their first year of marriage).
Table 8: HILDA. Assortative mating by happiness level in the first year of marriage.
Husband’s happiness
Wife’s happiness 1 2 3
1 16.13 67.73 16.13
2 6.31 68.20 35.49
3 3.70 43.92 52.98
Note: 1 if self-declared happiness < 6; 2 if happiness
= 7, 8; 3 if happiness > 8. 16.13% of women in the
lowest happiness group are married with men in the
same group (in their first year of marriage).
Table 9: BHPS. Assortative mating by happiness level in the first year of marriage.
Husband’s happiness
Wife’s happiness 1 2 3
1 21.86 50.61 27.53
2 9.6 47.95 42.45
3 4.08 35.36 60.55
Note: 1 if self-declared happiness < 4; 2 if happiness
= 4.5; 3 if happiness > 6.7. 47.95% of women in the
intermediate happiness group are married with men
in the same group (in their first year of marriage).
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Correlates of the happiness gap
Table 10: GSOEP. Correlates of the happiness gap
W less happy than M W happier than M
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Happiness 5.93 1.84 75098 7.72 1.48 75094
Happiness difference -1.78 1.17 75098 1.78 1.17 75094
Age 47.02 14.27 75098 46.84 14.36 75094
Log household income 7.75 0.50 118308 7.74 0.50 119936
Household size 3.10 1.22 125622 3.10 1.22 127334
Number of children 0.75 1.02 125622 0.75 1.02 127334
Working full-time 0.68 0.02 85302 0.28 0.01 35237
Working part-time 0.02 0.01 1726 0.19 0.02 24229
Vocational training 0.001 0.01 462 0.01 0.01 791
Irregular part-time 0.01 0.01 1392 0.05 0.01 6133
Not working 0.29 1.67 36739 0.48 0.01 60939
Education years 11.28 2.48 35583 11.37 2.49 38225
< high school completed 0.29 0.01 10434 0.28 0.01 10614
High school completed 0.57 0.01 20158 0.57 0.01 21797
> high school completed 0.14 0.01 5114 0.16 0.01 5967
Annual working hours 858.00 964.21 36184 934.67 962.59 38940
Housework hours per week 9.01 4.86 35286 8.95 4.67 38103
Housework hours per week difference 6.19 5.58 32929 6.34 5.27 35491
Age at marriage 27.80 6.25 272 27.42 5.40 328
Height in cm 165.12 6.32 6494 165.20 6.36 6987
BMI 25.36 4.75 6464 25.21 4.75 6960
Annual doctor visits 14.12 21.63 33396 10.06 15.19 36068
Very good health 0.05 0.01 1258 0.10 0.01 2799
Good health 0.33 0.02 8502 0.41 0.45 12786
Satisfactory health 0.35 0.02 9234 0.33 0.01 9389
Poor health 0.21 0.01 5362 0.10 0.01 2942
Bad health 0.07 0.00 1744 0.02 0.01 449
Germany born 0.83 0.01 29692 0.83 0.01 31851
Both spouses Germany born 0.96 0.01 30355 0.96 0.01 28345
Importance of family 3.86 0.38 4968 3.88 0.33 5215
Note: This table shows the summary statistics of variables for respondents who were surveyed
in the GSOEP from 1984 to 2007 and who have a partner at time t. Means are reported for
the continuous variables and proportions are reported for categorical variables.
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Table 11: HILDA. Correlates of the happiness gap
Men Women
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Happiness 7.00 1.45 7932 8.79 1.05 9644
Happiness difference -1.69 1.07 7932 1.69 1.07 9644
Age 45.30 14.92 7932 44.55 14.47 9644
Log household income 5.92 0.63 7889 5.95 0.61 9613
Household size 3.15 1.29 7932 3.23 1.33 9644
Number of children 2.05 1.40 5369 2.10 1.41 6455
Employed 0.60 0.02 4789 0.59 0.01 5682
Unemployed 0.03 0.01 207 0.02 0.02 208
Not in the labor force 0.37 1.67 2936 0.39 0.01 3754
< high school completed 0.37 0.01 3003 0.39 0.01 3799
High school completed 0.14 0.01 1112 0.15 0.01 1419
> high school completed 0.48 0.01 3813 0.46 0.01 4423
Weekly working hours 32.26 14.69 4784 31.00 14.76 5675
Housework hours per week 19.12 14.35 6107 19.58 14.67 7442
Housework hours per week difference 12.73 15.89 5835 14.06 16.24 7116
Age at marriage 35.49 13.73 231 35.11 12.69 310
Very good health 0.08 0.00 543 0.14 0.01 1238
Good health 0.32 0.00 2330 0.40 0.02 3575
Satisfactory health 0.38 0.01 2787 0.34 0.02 3007
Poor health 0.17 0.01 1240 0.10 0.01 901
Bad health 0.05 0.01 354 0.02 0.00 168
Australian born 0.76 0.01 6044 0.75 0.01 7221
Both spouses Australian born 0.81 0.01 12428 0.81 0.01 12833
Importance of family 9.65 0.93 1280 9.80 0.75 1565
Note: This table shows the summary statistics of variables for respondents who were surveyed in the
HILDA from 2001 to 2007 and who have a partner at time t. Means are reported for the continuous
variables and proportions are reported for categorical variables.
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Table 12: BHPS. Correlates of the happiness gap
W less happy than M W happier than M
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Life satisfaction 4.29 1.18 11724 5.98 0.89 12959
Happiness difference (own minus spouse) -1.56 0.87 11724 1.53 0.84 12959
Age 42.64 11.88 11724 42.15 12.02 12959
Log real monthly personal income 6.60 1.10 11403 6.56 1.13 12594
Household size 3.23 1.24 11724 3.24 1.22 12959
Number of children (aged < 16) 0.79 1.04 11724 0.82 1.04 12959
Male 0.00 0.00 11724 0.00 0.00 12959
Paid employment 0.61 0.49 11719 0.61 0.49 12951
Self-employed 0.04 0.20 11719 0.05 0.21 12951
Unemployed 0.02 0.15 11719 0.02 0.13 12951
Retired 0.07 0.26 11719 0.08 0.27 12951
Maternity leave 0.06 0.24 11719 0.03 0.18 12951
Family care 0.01 0.10 11719 0.02 0.12 12951
Full-time student 0.17 0.37 11719 0.18 0.38 12951
Disabled, long-term sickness 0.01 0.10 11719 0.01 0.11 12951
Government training scheme 0.00 0.01 11719 0.00 0.02 12951
Other type of employment 0.00 0.07 11719 0.01 0.07 12951
Years of schooling 10.17 1.13 11338 10.15 1.17 12506
Less than first degree 0.87 0.34 11571 0.86 0.34 12796
Completed first degree 0.11 0.31 11571 0.11 0.31 12796
Completed higher degree 0.02 0.15 11571 0.03 0.16 12796
Maternity leave 0.06 0.24 11719 0.03 0.18 12951
Government training scheme 0.00 0.01 11719 0.00 0.02 12951
Other type of employment 0.00 0.07 11719 0.01 0.07 12951
Hours normally worked per week 18.19 16.58 11695 17.83 16.25 12932
Hours per week on housework 17.02 11.32 11588 17.36 11.20 12823
Diff. in hours of housework (own minus spouse) 11.21 13.37 11512 11.98 13.03 12740
Age at marriage 23.19 4.77 3922 23.52 4.70 4689
Height in centimeters 162.29 6.55 2170 162.71 6.48 2334
Body mass index 26.96 5.60 1684 26.69 5.38 1828
No doctor visits 0.17 0.37 11712 0.21 0.41 12948
One or two doctor visits 0.34 0.47 11712 0.38 0.49 12948
Three to five doctor visits 0.24 0.42 11712 0.22 0.41 12948
Six to ten doctor visits 0.13 0.34 11712 0.10 0.30 12948
More than ten doctor visits 0.13 0.34 11712 0.09 0.29 12948
Health: very poor 0.03 0.17 10514 0.01 0.11 11559
Health: poor 0.11 0.31 10514 0.05 0.23 11559
Health: fair 0.25 0.43 10514 0.18 0.38 11559
Health: good 0.44 0.50 10514 0.48 0.50 11559
Health: excellent 0.17 0.37 10514 0.27 0.45 11559
Born in UK 0.95 0.23 11661 0.95 0.23 12890
Both spouses born in UK 0.92 0.27 10916 0.92 0.27 12197
Resp. looks after household money 0.27 0.45 1048 0.24 0.42 1140
Partner looks after household money 0.13 0.34 1048 0.12 0.33 1140
Respondent given household allowance 0.04 0.20 1048 0.06 0.24 1140
Partner given household allowance 0.01 0.08 1048 0.01 0.11 1140
Finances shared 0.47 0.50 1048 0.51 0.50 1140
Finances maintained separately 0.07 0.25 1048 0.05 0.22 1140
Importance of good partnership 9.60 0.98 1816 9.75 0.72 2069
Importance of children 8.20 2.62 1816 8.51 2.41 2065
Religion makes a difference 0.35 0.48 3190 0.35 0.48 3590
Note: BHPS 1996–2007. The sample includes only women who live with a partner in t. Also, in this cross-table, women who report the
same satisfaction level as their partner are dropped.
Table 13: Lagged values of the absolute value of the happiness gap between spouses
Absolute value of the happiness gap GSOEP HILDA BHPS
1 year lagged 0.0016 0.0026 -0.00062
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.00063)
2 years lagged 0.0013 0.0032 -0.00060
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.00069)
3 years lagged 0.0010 0.0017 0.00081
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.00063)
4 years lagged 0.0011 0.0019 -0.0014
(0.0004) (0.0014) (0.00089)
5 years lagged 0.0007 0.0046 0.00044
(0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0011)
Note: Each coefficient (each cell) corresponds to a separate regression, in which the indi-
cated lagged happiness gap is introduced in addition to the current absolute value of the
happiness gap, total happiness and the other usual controls (age, age difference, number
of children, log household income). The standard errors are adjusted for clustering at
the individual level.
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Divorce and happiness gaps in the first year of marriage
Table 14: GSOEP. Probit estimate of the probability that a separation is EVER observed
in the survey. Female sample. Legally married couples.
Marg. eff. t
Absolute value of happiness difference 0.023775 1.7
Total happiness -0.000029 0.1
Age -0.001442 0.5
Own age minus spouse age -0.005222 1.3
Number of children 0.052937 2.2
Log real monthly household income -0.234742 5.5
Pseudo R squared 0.0467
Number of observations 899
Note: Only married couples. Standard errors clustered at the individual
level.
Table 15: HILDA. Probit estimate of the probability that a separation is EVER observed
in the survey. Female sample. Legally married couples.
Marg. eff. t
Absolute value of happiness difference 0.023076 2.4
Total happiness -0.004078 0.6
Age 0.000474 0.4
Own age minus spouse age -0.001135 0.4
Number of children 0.009816 1.0
Log real monthly household income -0.026942 0.8
Pseudo R squared 0.0504
Number of observations 434
Note: Only married couples. Standard errors clustered at the individual
level.
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Table 16: BHPS. Probit estimate of the probability that a separation is EVER observed
in the survey. Female sample. Legally married couples.
Marg. eff. t
Absolute value of happiness difference .04277 2.6
Total happiness -.02551 -2.6
Age -.001982 -1.1
Own age minus spouse age .0001699 0.1
Number of children (aged < 16) .02546 1.5
Log real monthly household income -.0613 -2.2
Pseudo R squared 0.04
Number of observations 845
Note: Only married couples. Standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Fixed effect estimates of the probability to divorce
Table 17: GSOEP. Xtlogit estimates of the probability to break-up next year. Female
sample. Legally married couples.
Marg. eff. t
Own happiness<spouse’s happiness 0.212690 2.5
Own happiness>spouse’s happiness -0.007472 0.2
Total happiness -0.210938 16.0
Age 0.235927 20.7
Own age minus spouse age -0.084382 2.7
Number of children -0.275478 3.5
Log real monthly household income -0.081417 0.8
Log likelihood -6680
Observations 90381
Number of groups 1189
Min. obs. per group 2
Avg. obs. per group 8
Max. obs. per group 23
Note: Only married couples. Omitted reference category: own hap-
piness = spouse’s happiness. Standard errors clustered at individual
level.
Table 18: BHPS. Xtlogit estimates of the probability to break-up next year. Female sam-
ple. Legally married couples.
Coeff. t
Own happiness < spouse’s happiness .3202 1.4
Own happiness > spouse’s happiness .1279 0.6
Total happiness -.3356 -5.5
Age .4563 9.5
Own age minus spouse age -.2879 -4.7
Number of children (aged < 16) .2509 1.4
Log real monthly household income -.007731 -0.0
Log likelihood -279.39
Observations 1193
Number of groups 264
Min. obs. per group 2
Avg. obs. per group 4.5
Max. obs. per group 10
Note: Only married couples. Omitted reference category: own hap-




Table 19: GSOEP. Probit estimate of the probability to break-up next year. Female sam-
ple. Only legally married couples.
Marg. eff. t
Own happiness<spouse’s happiness 0.004972 5.4
Own happiness>spouse’s happiness 0.000304 0.3
Total happiness -0.001881 17.0
Age 0.000209 7.3
Own age minus spouse age -0.000416 4.7
Number of children 0.001129 2.7
Log real monthly household income -0.003237 4.1
Pseudo R squared 0.0374
Number of observations 90381
Note: Only married couples. Omitted reference category: own happi-
ness = spouse’s happiness. Standard errors clustered at the individual
level.
Table 20: HILDA. Probit estimate of the probability to break-up next year. Female sam-
ple. Only legally married couples.
Marg. eff. t
Own happiness<spouse’s happiness 0.004062 1.9
Own happiness>spouse’s happiness 0.000280 0.2
Total happiness -0.002779 7.3
Age -0.00053 6.5
Own age minus spouse age 0.000519 2.2
Number of children 0.002473 3.4
Log real monthly household income -0.004762 3.1
Pseudo R squared 0.0612
Number of observations 16150
Note: Only married couples. Omitted reference category: own hap-
piness = spouse’s happiness. Standard errors clustered at individual
level.
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Table 21: BHPS. Probit estimate of the probability to break-up next year. Female sample.
Only legally married couples
Marg. eff. t
Own happiness < spouse’s happiness .002777 2.1
Own happiness > spouse’s happiness .0000109 0.0
Total happiness -.002793 -11.6
Age -.000585 -12.1
Own age minus spouse age .0003519 2.8
Number of children (aged < 16) .0007222 1.7
Log real monthly household income -.001796 -2.5
Pseudo R squared 0.11
Number of observations 25246
Note: Only married couples. Omitted reference category: own happiness
= spouse’s happiness. Standard errors clustered at individual level
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